Preface
There is a habit, among people who write about Singapore, of reaching for superlatives. The place invites them. But superlatives are the wrong instrument for understanding what Singapore is and how it came to be the way it is, and this book is built on the opposite conviction: that the most respectful and the most useful thing one can say about Singapore is specific, and that the specifics are more impressive than any superlative would be.
Consider where the country started. When Singapore became independent in 1965 it was a small island with no natural resources, separated from the hinterland that might have fed and watered it, and surrounded by larger neighbours with their own ambitions. Lee Kuan Yew, looking back on those years, described the difficulty plainly: how hard it was, he said, for “a small country to survive with no natural resources, cut off from its natural hinterland, and surrounded by nationalistic new states.”1 Few observers at the time expected the experiment to last. The country that the rest of the world now calls, half affectionately and half in disbelief, the little red dot, was widely expected not to make it.
It made it, and the reason it made it is the reason this book exists. Singapore did not survive by luck or by the discovery of oil under the harbour. It survived, and then prospered, by a deliberate decision to be more reliable, more institutionally coherent, and more useful to the rest of the world than a country of its size had any right to be. Water security was engineered out of vulnerability rather than inherited. A port became indispensable because policy made it so. A legal system was built to be trusted by people who had no other reason to trust the place. Where most small countries accept that their size is their fate, Singapore decided, as a matter of strategy sustained across decades, to out-think its size. That single decision is the thread that runs through everything this book describes, and it is the thing a European firm is actually buying when it chooses Singapore: not the cheapest base, and not the largest market, but the most reliable one, built that way on purpose.
Water is the clearest illustration, and it is worth dwelling on for a moment because it sets the pattern for everything else. A country with little fresh water of its own, historically dependent on supply piped across the Causeway from Malaysia under agreements with a fixed expiry, could have treated that dependence as a permanent fact of geography. Singapore instead treated it as a problem to be engineered away. Through its national water agency it built what it calls the Four National Taps: water from local catchment, imported water, reclaimed water produced by advanced membrane filtration and ultraviolet treatment, and desalinated seawater, deliberately diversified so that no single source, and no single neighbour, holds the country’s survival in its hands.2 The reclaimed-water programme in particular turned a vulnerability into a capability that the country now exports as expertise. This is the Singapore method in miniature: identify the structural weakness, refuse to accept it as fate, and out-engineer it through patient, well-funded, long-horizon policy. The same instinct that produced water security produced the port, the legal system, the financial centre, and, in our own time, the digital economy this book describes.
This is a book about the digital expression of that strategy. Singapore has applied the same deliberate intelligence to its digital economy that it once applied to its harbour and its water: a regulator that publishes its reasoning so that firms can plan against it, a data-centre estate managed for the long term rather than the quick lease, a research and innovation posture that funds serious work through named institutions, and a financial-technology framework that has become the benchmark for the region. None of these is described in this book with the word “innovative,” because the word explains nothing. What is described is what Singapore actually does, agency by agency and framework by framework, because the doing is the point and the doing is what a newcomer needs to understand.
I have lived and worked in Singapore for more than twenty-one years, as a real estate agent placing European firms into Singapore property and as a commercial mediator resolving their disputes. The two roles teach the same lesson. A European firm coming to Singapore is not doing a deal; it is entering a relationship with a place that lasts years and changes shape as it goes. The property choice constrains the exit. The vendor contract shapes the regulatory exposure. The dispute, when it comes, turns on relationships formed long before. What such a firm needs is not a broker but someone who holds the whole picture and is still there when the questions change. The digital economy, with its regulated functions and its multi-year licences, makes this truer than any sector I know. I studied at MIT and have spent a working life close to these technologies, teaching them and using them; that is partly why I find Singapore’s digital strategy worth a book.
It would be easy, and useless, to argue that Singapore is right for every European digital business. It is not. For a firm that needs low-cost engineering at scale, a large domestic market, or a cheap back office, Singapore is the wrong answer, and the chapters say so plainly and early. Singapore is the right answer for a narrower set of firms than its admirers pretend, and for those firms it is right in a way few places are. Knowing the difference is what the rest of this book is for.
There is also a question of timing, which an honest preface should not pretend away. The firms reading this book are not, for the most part, choosing between Singapore and a settled, predictable home. They are deciding how much of their future to anchor in a single place, in a world that has become harder to predict than it was a decade ago. Prudent firms have always diversified their markets and their suppliers; fewer have thought as carefully about diversifying the ground beneath the operation itself. Singapore offers ground that is meant to hold: a place built, deliberately and over decades, to be stable when stability is scarce, to keep the power on and the law steady and the long horizon in view. I write about it partly because I believe in that kind of patient construction, and partly because I would like to see more of the world’s serious enterprise, and the livelihoods it carries, find a footing here. This book is an account of how that footing is found, for the firm prepared to bring something worth building.
References
Published by Singapore Mediation Solutions, Singapore Open access under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
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Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister. Speech at the Tanjong Pagar Community Development Council Singapore 21 Forum, 18 September 1999. National Archives of Singapore. https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/1999091804.htm ↩︎
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PUB, Singapore’s National Water Agency. The Four National Taps (local catchment water, imported water, NEWater reclaimed water produced through microfiltration, reverse osmosis, and ultraviolet disinfection, and desalinated water). PUB. https://www.pub.gov.sg/ ; see also National Library Board, Singapore, Four National Taps. https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2019-05-24_170025.html ↩︎